Before the Lockdown 2.0, the German German economy – after bottoming out in May (cf. here) – rebounding in June (cf. here), July (cf. here) and August (here) – somewhat climaxed in September 2020 (here). The question, hence, is whether in anticipation of the new Lockdown in Germany (which finally came into force only on 2 November 2020 but was heavily discussed since mid-October) already put a break on the rising economy in October. So, let’s look into the German economy in some more detail:
After the German legislator had only reformed the German Money Laundering Act in 2017 due to European requirements, he must now hurry again, because the EU has given it only until the end of the year 2020 to implement renewed tightening of the regulations against money laundering (see for the previous fundamental reform of 2017 here). Thus, the German Bundestag has already on 20 November 2020 – relatively unnoticed by the public – debated in first reading on the “Draft Act to improve the criminal law fight against money laundering”. The law contains at least a paradigm shift, which should make the new provison of § 261 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch, the German Criminal Code) also “interesting” for the German Michel:
Again, unfortunately, close to the eleventh hour of October I am able to review the fate of the German economy in September. And, again, the German German economy – after bottoming out in May (cf. here) – started its rebound in June (cf. here), the rebound gaining momentum in July (cf. here) and August (here) and continued its upward trend in September 2020. But, hey, let’s look into the German economy in some more detail:
Hey, great that I may still experience this in my life-time! Almost ten years after my “Plädoyer für ein vorinsolvenzliches Sanierungsverfahren” (ZInsO 2011, 57, here, in German) and a good four years after my (rather rhetorical) question “Bedingt Sanierungsbereit?” (ZInsO 2016, 1778, here, in German), the has government (finally) finally presented the draft of the “Act on the Further Development of Reorganisation Law” (“Sanierungsrechtsfortentwicklungsgesetz – SanInsFoG“), which at least takes into account a large part of the reform proposals suggested in the two articles (and not only by me!). Thus, after many detours (only to mention “ESUG“, cf. here) – and driven by the European Union – the German legislator has finally warmed up to functioning mechanisms for corporate restructuring outside of insolvency. And, even if not all that glitters in the draft is gold, it is a BIG step in the right direction, as the following initial analysis shows:
The laws enacted by the legislator at the end of March 2020 to mitigate the consequences of the corona virus pandemic (“Corona Consequences Mitigation Act” („Corona-Folgen-Abmilderungsgesetz“), see here for details) were limited in time and would have mostly expired at the end of September 2020. In view of the ongoing pandemic, some of the relevant regulations have now been readjusted, but extended in total at least until the end of 2020.
Literally at the eleventh hour of September I got to finish my review of the German economy in August – rather for purposes of chronology than actual information. Still it is a worthwhile look to behold, the German German economy – after bottoming out in May (cf. here) – started its rebound in June (cf. here), the rebound gaining momentum in July (cf. here), August figures overall seem to indicate a further strengthening of this trend. But, hey, let’s look into the German economy in some more detail:
In its meeting on Monday evening, 25 August 2020, the coalition committee of the coalition of CDU and SPD forming the Federal Government decided, among other things, under Top 3 point 8: “The regulation on the suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency for the reason for filing for insolvency of over-indebtedness will continue … more
Having already dealt with the liability of the restructuring consultant (here, in German) or the managing director (in DIP-procedures, here) in previous posts, a recent landmark ruling by the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof“, “BGH“) gives me the opportunity to shed some light on the liability risks of the insolvency administrator, with a focus on the area of corporate restructuring (accordingly, I will not address the liability of a provisional administrator or liability in the event of non-fulfilment of mass debts under § 61 InsO).
One of my last posts on Internal Investigations (here, in German) ended with the following remark:
“Before commissioning [investigators], […] the objective of the investigation and the tactics of the approach should be defined and a suitable project team should be appointed to ensure that the objective is achieved in a cost-efficient manner.”