The laws enacted by the legislator at the end of March 2020 to mitigate the consequences of the corona virus pandemic (“Corona Consequences Mitigation Act” („Corona-Folgen-Abmilderungsgesetz“), see here for details) were limited in time and would have mostly expired at the end of September 2020. In view of the ongoing pandemic, some of the relevant regulations have now been readjusted, but extended in total at least until the end of 2020.
Literally at the eleventh hour of September I got to finish my review of the German economy in August – rather for purposes of chronology than actual information. Still it is a worthwhile look to behold, the German German economy – after bottoming out in May (cf. here) – started its rebound in June (cf. here), the rebound gaining momentum in July (cf. here), August figures overall seem to indicate a further strengthening of this trend. But, hey, let’s look into the German economy in some more detail:
In its meeting on Monday evening, 25 August 2020, the coalition committee of the coalition of CDU and SPD forming the Federal Government decided, among other things, under Top 3 point 8: “The regulation on the suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency for the reason for filing for insolvency of over-indebtedness will continue … more
Having already dealt with the liability of the restructuring consultant (here, in German) or the managing director (in DIP-procedures, here) in previous posts, a recent landmark ruling by the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof“, “BGH“) gives me the opportunity to shed some light on the liability risks of the insolvency administrator, with a focus on the area of corporate restructuring (accordingly, I will not address the liability of a provisional administrator or liability in the event of non-fulfilment of mass debts under § 61 InsO).
One of my last posts on Internal Investigations (here, in German) ended with the following remark:
“Before commissioning [investigators], […] the objective of the investigation and the tactics of the approach should be defined and a suitable project team should be appointed to ensure that the objective is achieved in a cost-efficient manner.”
In my loose sequence on possibilities of corporate financing, after Sale and Lease Back (here), this time I will turn to the so-called Schuldscheindarlehen (promissory note loan), which has resurfaced from oblivion again since the last financial crisis. Particularly in the current corona crisis, some companies are apparently “sucking up” liquidity with the help of this instrument: Bosch, for example, took out loans with a volume of 2 billion euros by June 2020 by placing a promissory note loan (here), and as recently as April 2020, automotive supplier Schaeffler issued promissory notes with a volume of 350 million euros (here).
Throughout the last month, the bad news kept indeed (cf. here) constantly flowing in like waves on a beach. Given the easing of the lockdown and the first tentative steps to reopen the economy at the end of May the question is whether the German economy already bottomed out. To get a grip on that, let’s look into the German economy in some more detail:
In response to the burgeoning economic crisis following Corona, which is likely to “wash a number of economic crimes to the surface”, the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV) published the draft Bill of an “Act to Strengthen Integrity in the Economy” on 22 April 2020 after a coordination process with interested bodies (cf. already here).